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FAUSTIAN BARGAINS: 
ENTANGLEMENTS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN 
AMERICA 
 
STEVEN ALAN SAMSON* 
 
Abstract 
As the state extends its operations into all areas of social life, it breaches the 
protective 'wall of separation' that has traditionally kept the church free from 
overt regulation by the civil authorities. This is manifested in several ways: 
first, a statutory extension of state police powers through social legislation; 
second, a restriction or pre-emption of certain activities that were once held 
to be outside the purview of the state; third, a vitiation of the principle of 
religious non-interference through judicial interpretations of the First 
Amendment; and fourth, an adversary posture toward churches taken by 
many agencies of the state while pursuing their regulatory objectives. As a 
consequence, churches are facing novel restraints on their ecclesiastical or 
corporate rights, immunities, and privileges. Originally written in 1984, this 
piece is updated by a brief review of subsequent developments that 
addressed many of these concerns. 
 
I   INTRODUCTION  
 
Two subjects most apt to be avoided in polite conversation are religion and 
politics.  The reasons are not hard to fathom.  We express our values and 
views in mixed company at the risk of exposing our identity:  perhaps also 
our ignorance. Explanations are most easily avoided by a circumspect 
silence. As citizens of an increasingly pluralistic America, we put a 
                                                     
*
 Professor, Helms School of Government, Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia.  
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premium on anonymity and privacy with regard to personal convictions.
1
 
  
Consequently, these most public of commitments – religion and politics – 
are kept most private and guarded as Rumpelstiltskin guarded his name.  
Matters of faith tend to be consigned to a tacit dimension of being:  a 
Homeric netherworld of the sort once inhabited by shades of the Greek 
dead.  Religion in particular is becoming more mystic or ineffable, 
confirming psychologically a dualism in our thinking that has been 
embraced by modern philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein concluded his 
Tractatus on this rather diffident note: „What we cannot speak about we 
must pass over in silence.‟2  J. Glenn Gray has characterized the abstraction 
of modern social life as a consequence of its godlessness.
3
 
 
 
                                                     
1
This contrasts with the earlier emphasis on cultural life in which politics and religion 
were the great issues.  See Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer, Unbelief in Religion and 
Politics, ed. and trans. Henry Van Dyke (Amsterdam: The Groen van Prinsterer Fund, 
1975), 16: „Lamennais writes correctly: 'There are truths and errors which are at once 
religious and political, since religion and society have the same origin, namely God, 
and the same end, namely man.  Thus a fundamental error in religion is also a 
fundamental error in politics, and vice versa.'‟  See also Richard E. Morgan, The 
Politics of Religious Conflict: Church and State in America (New York: Pegasus, 
1968), 21-23, on the close affinity between mainline Protestant and secularist 
perceptions with regard to church and state. 
2
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2nd ed., trans. D. F. Pears and 
B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 151.  Working within 
the tradition of Kantian philosophy, Wittgenstein made an absolute distinction 
between facts and values that led to a kind of „ethical mysticism.‟ Allan Janik and 
Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 150-
61, 232-35.  This resolution of the dualism of fact and value is comparable to the 
„semantic mysticism‟ that, according to some critics, characterizes so much of modern 
theology.  See Hazel E. Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics (New York: Vintage Books, 
1967), 379-99. 
3
J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper & Row, 
1959; Perennial Library, 1973), xxii.  Gray, an American existentialist philosopher, 
regarded this change as an increasingly negative development. 
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II    RELIGION AND POLITICS 
 
We are confronted by a twin paradox in America today:  the private 
Christian and the private citizen.  In a bygone generation, the Christian 
gospel was openly proclaimed abroad in the land.  Christianity was 
recognized as part of the common law.  Today, the proclamation is muted 
and the recognition of our Christian legal tradition is indistinct, even in the 
churches.  The public religiosity of an earlier era has retreated from 
community life.  A malaise has settled over the civil pageantry of the 
boisterous young republic that once marked time with seven league boots.  
Even the obligatory lip service paid to civic virtue by dubious politicians 
and doubtful citizens has grown cold.
4
  Shakespeare's Brutus suggested a 
diagnosis for times like ours:  
When love begins to sicken and decay, 
It useth an enforced ceremony. 
There are no tricks in plain and simple faith: 
But hollow men, like horses hot at hand, 
Make gallant show and promise of their mettle; 
                                                     
4
 Borrowing a page from George Santayana, Leo Marx characterized the switch from a 
religious to a pragmatic emphasis in American letters as a change of language from 
the civil religion of the genteel tradition to the vernacular of the „cruder, more 
colloquial, closer to the raw, often profane particularities of everyday life in the West.‟  
Marx quoted Ralph Waldo Emerson to the effect that „the corruption of man is 
followed by a corruption of language‟ and reiterated George Orwell's maxim that „the 
great enemy of clear language is insincerity.‟  Leo Marx, „The Uncivil Response of 
American Writers to Civil Religion in America,‟ in American Civil Religion, ed. 
Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones (New York: Harper & Row, 1974),   226-27.  
These observations may be compared with Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Speech and 
Reality (Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books, 1970),  10.  While Gilbert Keith Chesterton once 
complimented America as the only nation founded upon a creed, he similarly warned 
against an insincere solemnity that is so often associated with church life.  He 
regretted the weakness and weariness he saw in American politics and regarded them 
as evidence of decadence.  See Sidney E. Mead, „The „Nation with the Soul of a 
Church,‟‟ in Richey and Jones, op. cit., 45; Gilbert K. Chesterton, Heretics, 3rd ed. 
(New York: John Lane Company, 1906), 216-31, 263-66. 
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But when they should endure the bloody spur, 
They fall their crests, and, like deceitful jades, 
Sink in the trial.
5
 
 
We live in an age of transition.  Sporadic church attendance and low voter 
turnouts each express a growing disdain for any sort of confessionalism or 
civic obligation.  Where once a confident public philosophy held court,
6
 a 
strident skepticism has displaced the fairly broad moral consensus that, 
according to James Hitchcock, prevailed „until sometime after 1960.‟ 
 
While there were inevitable disagreements over values, in retrospect these 
seem to have been relatively minor in scope, occurring within an accepted 
framework of belief.  To cite one particularly sensitive example, the nation 
was overwhelmingly family-oriented.  Hence there was general agreement 
about the undesirability of divorce, unmarried cohabitation, homosexuality, 
and other practices.  However common they may have been in actuality, 
there was little inclination to defend them in theory.  Agencies of public 
expression, like the schools and the mass media, tended overwhelmingly to 
honor this moral consensus.
7 
                                                     
5
 Julius Caesar, act 4, sc. 2, lines 20-27. 
6
 Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Company, 1955; New York: New American Library), 136-37, attempted to 
reformulate the earlier theistic public philosophy in terms that would be acceptable to 
an agnostic generation since, as he acknowledged, „public philosophy is in large 
measure discredited among contemporary men.‟ 
7
 James Hitchcock, „Competing Ethical Systems,‟ Imprimis, April 1981, 1.  Harold 
Berman, who argues for a religious and against an instrumental conception of law, 
believes that a profound shift toward an exclusively secular theory of law has taken 
place during the last two generations.  As a result, law is becoming unenforceable to 
the extent that it is seen merely as something expedient or arbitrary.  „If law is to be 
measured only by standards of experience, or workability, and not by standards of 
truth or rightness, then it will be difficult to enforce it against those who think it does 
not serve their interests . . . . One who rules by law is not compelled to be everywhere 
with his police force.  I think this point is proved today in a negative way by the fact 
that in our cities that branch of the law in which the sanctions are most severe, namely 
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Indeed, this consensus was securely established within our legal system, 
despite some signs of fraying at the edges even before the 1960s.  A radical 
shattering of this outwardly Christian set of expectations scarcely could 
have been anticipated.  The current fragmentation of values is being viewed 
positively within what Hitchcock calls the „new pluralism‟ as a means to 
effect the transition from one orthodoxy to another. 
 
While the call for “pluralism” is ostensibly merely a call for tolerance – a 
request that the reigning orthodoxy make room for newer “points of view” – 
in practice an orthodoxy which loses its authority has trouble even retaining 
the right of toleration.  Although it is still extended bare legal toleration, in 
practice it finds itself more and more on the defensive, its very right to exist 
challenged in numerous ways.
8
 
                                                                                                                                                           
the criminal law, has been powerless to create fear when it has failed to create respect 
by other means.‟  Harold Berman, „The Interaction of Law and Religion,‟ Mercer Law 
Review, 31 (1980): 409. 
8
 Ibid.,   2. See also Gary North, „The Intellectual Schizophrenia of the New Christian 
Right,‟ Christianity and Civilization, 1 (Spring 1982): 23: „Education is deeply 
religious.  So is any system of legislation.  We cannot escape religion.  There is no 
neutrality.  Everyone uses the neutrality doctrine in order to create his own version of 
theocracy: humanist theocracy (man is God), Marxist theocracy (the proletariat is 
God), anarchist theocracy (the free market is God), or whatever.  They use the 
doctrine of religious liberty to enthrone an anti-Christian social order -- an order 
which does not allow Christians to establish their God-ordained theocracy.  (I am 
using theocracy here as „the rule of God,‟ not the rule of ordained priests or the 
institutional church.)  In short, those using the religious liberty argument say that they 
are maintaining a society open to all religions, when in fact it will be a society closed 
to the God of the Bible and His law-order.‟  The experience of churches in the Soviet 
Union may serve as an illustration.  Religious liberty was constitutionally guaranteed 
but the teaching of religion to children is prohibited to all except their parents.  
Vladimir Gsovski pointed out in the 1930s that Soviet policy was to dismember the 
old Orthodox establishment into isolated local units and deprive churches of their 
property holdings.  Although the use of church buildings was granted by local soviets 
free of charge, members of the church were required to assume all financial 
responsibilities: taxes, fees, and obligatory insurance payments.  Congregations were 
not allowed to incorporate and, for a time, members of the clergy were disfranchised.  
Vladimir Gsovski, „Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia,‟ Fordham Law 
Review, 8 (1939): 1-28.  The 1977 Soviet Constitution contained the following 
provision in Article 52: „In the USSR the church is separate from the state, and the 
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The bedrock of this older orthodoxy was an accommodation between 
church and state designed to maintain standards of law and morality based 
on Christianity.  The disestablishment of the state churches appears to have 
been originally intended to strengthen rather than impair the cooperation 
between church and state as institutions.  This is attested by numerous court 
rulings, including the decision of the Supreme Court of New York in the 
case of People v. Ruggles, 8 Johnson 296, 297 (1811): 
 
Though the constitution has discarded religious establishments, it does not 
forbid judicial cognisance of those offences against religion and morality 
which have no reference to any such establishment, or to any particular form 
of government, but are punishable because they strike at the root of moral 
obligation and weaken the security of the social ties . . . . The legislative 
exposition of the constitution is conformable to this view of it. 
 
Here the Court noted at 296-97 that „the people of this state, in common 
with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of christianity 
as the rule of their faith and practice . . . .‟  Although the political system is 
not derived from any particular statement of religious doctrine, it was 
predominantly Christian in its legal assumptions, moral values, and 
religious sympathies.
9
 
 
Today, however, there is strong evidence of a growing separation of the 
                                                                                                                                                           
school is separate from the church.‟  Robert Sharlet, The  New Soviet Constitution of 
1977: Analysis and Text (Brunswick, OH: King's Court Communications, 1978),   93. 
9
 See H. B. Clark, Biblical Law: Being a Text of the Statutes, Ordinances, and 
Judgments Established in the Holy Bible -- With Many Allusions to Secular Laws: 
Ancient, Medieval and Modern -- Documented to the Scriptures, Judicial Decisions 
and Legal Literature (Portland, OR: Binfords & Mort, 1943),  36-41. 
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American legal and political system as a whole from its original, basically 
Christian, presuppositions.  This trend raises questions of both a theoretical 
and practical nature concerning the nature and direction of the change.
10
  
The object of this study is to analyse and evaluate the implications of 
current public policy concerning the relationship of church and state and to 
do so in the context of a Christian philosophy of history, law, and 
government. 
 
III    CHURCH, STATE, AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The central questions of philosophy often lie at the frontiers of several 
disciplines.  The problem of delineating the proper spheres of church and 
state, for instance, raises issues of great consequence in the fields of law, 
theology, political theory, and economics. The institutional conflicts 
between church and state nevertheless point to an even more fundamental 
question about the proper source of authority to which each may appeal:  
Who or what wields ultimate power in society?  This is the question of 
sovereignty.  It asks:  What is the court of last resort?  Where does the buck 
stop?  The answers of philosophers and statesmen throughout history have 
been varied and often irreconcilable:  the polis, the people, the king, the 
constitution, the church, humanity, destiny, and God.  For our purposes 
here, the options ultimately boil down to two:  God or Caesar. 
                                                     
10
 In commenting on a book by Herman Wouk, Robert Ulich remarks: „The author 
rightly believes that the Jewish people would not have survived the long years of 
persecution without faithful adherence to their rituals, festivals, and prayers.  May 
then not the loss of the Christian past not jeopardize the future of this nation, just as 
the desertion from the covenant would have jeopardized the survival of the Jews?  
Nations, as well as men, though living by bread, do not live by bread alone.‟  Paul A. 
Freund and Robert Ulich, Religion and the Public Schools (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965), 40.  See Berman, „Interaction,‟ Mercer Law Review, 405-13. 
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Our American forebears were faced with the delicate task of founding and 
properly outfitting a new system of government that would distribute 
authority, protect liberty, and simultaneously guard against the abuses of 
both.  By the time of the Declaration of Independence, the concept of legal 
sovereignty that had for so long been claimed by kings and parliaments was 
thoroughly discredited.
11
  It is noteworthy that the Constitution does not 
even use the word sovereignty and, instead, reserves for itself the more 
modest status of „supreme law of the land,‟ a concept that may be traced 
back to the Bible through the Magna Charta.
12
  The founders recognized 
                                                     
11
 See, for example, Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), 267-75; and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition 
in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955), 44-45.  On the term „political 
sovereignty,‟ see John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections 
on the American Proposition (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 70-71:  „Nowhere 
in the American structure is there accumulated the plenitude of legal sovereignty 
possessed in England by the Queen in Parliament.  In fact, the term 'legal sovereignty' 
makes no sense in America, where sovereignty (if the alien term must be used) is 
purely political.  The United States has a government, or better, a structure of 
governments operating on different levels.  The American state has no sovereignty in 
the classic continental sense.  Within society, as distinct from the state, there is room 
for the independent exercise of an authority which is not of the state.  This principle 
has more than once been affirmed by American courts, most recently by the Supreme 
Court in the Kedroff case.  The validity of this principle strengthens the stability of the 
Church's condition at law.‟  See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 
(1952).  But an unfortunate consequence of the inability or unwillingness by the courts 
to take faithfulness to doctrinal standards into consideration – as in Kedroff – is that 
they are often unable to provide relief to an orthodox faction seeking to prevent a 
congregational or denominational takeover.  Corporation and property laws place the 
burden of responsibility on churches and denominations to anticipate and protect 
themselves against any such eventuality.  Many churches are wary of the implications 
of incorporating, submitting to regulation, or turning to the secular courts. 
12
 See Helen Silving, „The Origins of the Magnae Cartae,‟ Harvard Journal of 
Legislation, 3 (1965): 117-31.  Reprinted in Helen Silving, Sources of Law (Buffalo, 
NY: William S. Hein and Co., 1968),  237-49.  Thomas J. Higgins, Judicial Review 
Unmasked (West Hanover, MA: Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 51-52, deals 
with the difficulty of trying to reconcile a separation of powers with the concept of 
political sovereignty. 
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that ultimate authority must be located at a point beyond human 
intervention and, hence, beyond politics.  Noah Webster expressed a 
Christian understanding of sovereignty when he illustrated the word in his 
definition:  „Absolute sovereignty belongs to God only.‟13  Without this 
common understanding, the question of who wields ultimate power 
necessarily becomes the supreme object of political contention. 
  
The constitutional protection of the church from intervention by the state is 
a revolutionary idea.  From the earliest days of the church, monarchs had 
often claimed authoritative powers in matters of church doctrine and 
government.  The authority of the Roman emperor as the supreme pontiff 
over the state religion was maintained to some degree even as the empire 
became nominally Christian, though it was expressly repudiated by the 
Christian emperor, Gratian. 
  
During the centuries that followed, emperors, popes, and kings fought to 
possess the keys to the kingdom of God.  The American historian, Sanford 
H. Cobb, could thus remark with some justification that, in light of the long 
history of political absolutism, „this pure religious liberty may be justly 
rated as the great gift of America to civilization and the world. . . .‟14  
Although Americans tend to take this gift for granted today, the proper 
juxtaposition of church and state is still an unsettled question. 
  
Some degree of political divisiveness is to be expected when the place of 
                                                     
13
 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language, vol. 2 (New York: 
S. Converse, 1828; San Francisco: Foundation for American Christian Education, 
1967), 76. 
14
 Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty: A History (New York: Macmillan, 
1902; Burt Franklin, 1970), 2. 
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the church in society is discussed because it involves the issue of ultimate 
allegiance.  With the secularization of our cultural institutions, people's 
expectations about the interaction of church and state have changed.
15
  
Many Americans now regard the church as an unrepresentative special 
interest group and thus expect it to play a subordinate, even invisible, role 
in public affairs.  This attitude is probably nearly as prevalent among 
church members as among non-members. 
  
Pluralism is frequently prescribed as an antidote to the divisiveness of 
religious orthodoxies and enjoys a favourable image as a common 
denominator or neutral value.
16
  According to Sidney Mead, it was the 
pluralist vision of a „cosmopolitan, inclusive, universal theology‟ that 
guided the founders.
17
 Similarly, it was an avowedly non-sectarian 
Christian moralism rather than religious skepticism that motivated Horace 
Mann and other supporters of the public education movement early in the 
nineteenth century.
18
  But now that religion is generally considered to be a 
private affair, the church as an institution is today being relegated to the 
fringes of an avowedly pluralistic secular society.  In his study of the 
phenomenon of revolution during the last thousand years of western 
history, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy detected a gradual reversal in the 
identity of the public and private realms: 
 
                                                     
15
 David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (New York: Harper and Row, 
1978), 278-80. 
16
 See Mead, „Nation,‟ in American Civil Religion, ed.  Richey and Jones, 54-55, which 
distinguishes nonconformity from secularism. 
17
 Ibid, 55. 
18
 See Rousas John Rushdoony, The Messianic Character of American Education: 
Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Education (Nutley, NJ: The Craig Press, 
1963). 
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Church and economy have changed their places during the last thousand 
years . . . . The universal church becomes more and more particular in her 
operations; economy becomes more and more universally organized.  We 
still pray for One Catholic Church.  The real trouble of the future will be, 
whether we can pray for it sincerely or not.  It is true that for ten centuries 
the nations carried both visions, the vision of local rights and private 
property, and the vision of a universal realm of peace.  Private property is 
being attacked today on the same ground as the unity of faith.  Both ideals 
are imperilled.  Bolshevism is radical enough to make the church a private 
affair for the individual, and property the public affair of the community.  
But the question is not dependent on any subjective theory about Marxism.  
It is an issue for any government which subsidizes industry, taxes private 
educational institutions, propagates political ideas, or repopulates its 
deserted villages with self-subsisting homesteads.
19
 
 
Indeed, some secularists nurture a hope that the church will eventually die 
of sheer irrelevance if it is left isolated and unacknowledged.
20
 
  
Ironically, the problem of reconciling the claims of church and state may be 
a more urgent one for a nominally secular society than for one in which 
religion officially plays a leading civic role.  In the days when sovereignty 
was regarded as a transcendent concept, church and state at least had a 
common religious reference and a common source of appeal in Scripture, 
even though they may have competed for control of the civil sword from 
time to time.
21
  Now that sovereignty has been brought down to earth in the 
                                                     
19
 Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man (New 
York: William Morrow and Company, 1938),   496. 
20
 See, for example, John D. Dunphy, „A Religion for a New Age,‟ The Humanist, 
January/February, 1983,   23-26.  See also James Hitchcock, What is Secular 
Humanism?: Why Humanism Is Becoming Secular and How It Is Changing Our 
World (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Books, 1982),   105. 
21
 See Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America 
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name of the people, there is good reason to doubt that any institution 
remains sufficiently independent of the state to guarantee freedom of 
religion, or any other freedom, beyond the merest „considerations of what 
is expedient for the community itself.‟22 
  
The business of determining „community standards‟ is inherently moral or 
religious in nature.  Indeed, morality is just as readily legislated as it is 
preached or taught.  If, in fact, religiosity and morality are basic human 
traits, secularity and amorality are not their opposites.  The rejection of one 
system of values and beliefs only indicates that it has been replaced by 
another system considered more acceptable, believable, or valuable.  If the 
really salient issue were the establishment of religion, what would be 
gained by a community if, in disestablishing the church, it simply 
established the state in its place?
23
  When the state itself is sovereign, what 
                                                                                                                                                           
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963),   59.  For illustrations of this common religious 
reference, see B. F. Morris, Christian Life and Character of the Civil Institutions of 
the United States, Developed in the Official and Historical Annals of the Republic 
(Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 1864). 
 
22
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1963),   32.  Similarly, Woodrow Wilson „believed that 
laws must be adjusted to fit facts 'because the law . . . is the expression of the facts in 
legal relationships.  Laws have never altered the facts; laws have always necessarily 
expressed the facts.‟‟  Quoted in Herbert Schlossberg, Idols for Destruction: Christian 
Faith and Its Confrontation with American Society (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 1983),   14.  American legal philosophy tends toward a pragmatism that 
appears to be descended from scholastic nominalism.  In its historicism, it recalls what 
G. E. Moore called „the naturalistic fallacy.‟  See William K. Frankena, Ethics 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963),   81-82. 
23
 Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1931),   96-99, expresses concern about a tendency for the 
modern state to take the place of the church.  Richard John Neuhaus, „Law and the 
Rightness of Things,‟ Valparaiso Law Review, 14 (1979): 12, raises a similar concern: 
„This is precisely the cultural crisis of our society: the popularly accessible and vibrant 
belief systems and worldviews of our society are largely excluded from the public 
arena in which the decisions are made about how the society should be ordered . . . . 
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institution is sufficiently independent to stand apart from the state as a 
court of last resort fully equipped to assure civil and religious liberty?  This 
is the dilemma posed by any establishment of religion by the state. 
  
This is not to deny that disestablishment has created its share of difficulties.  
Even though Christianity still outwardly prevails as the majority religion, 
our accustomed religious liberty has furnished a rich soil for doctrinal 
innovations.  Otto Scott's analysis suggests some of the perplexities that 
confront historians as they interpret the nature of American religion: 
 
The United States was a government whose constitution claimed no higher 
authority than its own laws.  That was essentially a lawyer's concept of 
civilization, and could be traced not to the church, but to Roman tradition.  
The novelty of a nation without an official religion was not fully appreciated 
in 1830 -- for no land was as crowded with churches and no people more 
prone to use religious terminology and Christian references in everyday 
speech, in their writings, and in their thinking, than the Americans.  There 
was no question of the piety of millions.  There was equally little doubt that 
they did not fully realize that a land with no religious center is a land where 
religion is what anyone chooses to claim.
24
 
                                                                                                                                                           
With apologies to Spinoza, transcendence abhors a vacuum.  Today there is such a 
vacuum in the public space of American law and politics.  Unless it is democratically 
filled by the living moral tradition of the American people, it will surely be filled, as 
has so tragically happened elsewhere, by the pretensions of the modern state.  As the 
crisis of legitimacy deepens, it will lead – not next year, maybe not in twenty years, 
but all too soon – to totalitarianism or to insurrection, or to both.‟ 
 
24
 Otto J. Scott, The Secret Six: John Brown and the Abolitionist Movement (New York: 
Times Books, 1979),   97.  But other commentators, like Philip Schaff in the late 
nineteenth century, strongly disagreed with critics who charged the constitutional 
system with „political atheism.‟  It is important to realize, however, that this was 
largely a controversy among professing Christians.  See Philip Schaff, Church and 
State in the United States: or The American Idea of Religious Liberty and Its Practical 
Effects, Papers of the American Historical Association, vol. 2, no. 4 (New York: G.   
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The varieties of religious expression are paralleled by the seemingly 
endless permutations to public law that attempt to accommodate them.  No 
cultural vacuum remains unfilled for very long.  The retreat of the church 
from many of its earlier social welfare and education commitments has 
been matched by the advance of the state in these same areas.  The one has 
catalysed the other.  But the state has also come to be regarded as a vehicle 
for promoting civil and religious unity and universality.
25
  World history is 
the story of successive empires that have aspired to universal dominion in 
one form or another, among them Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, 
Islam, Germany, Mongolia, Spain, England, France, the Axis, America, 
and Russia. 
 
IV    THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY 
 
America has long been a prolific breeding ground for new cults.  In the 
absence of a healthy civil religion, almost anything goes.  The Harvard 
sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin, characterized this phenomenon as “chaotic 
syncretism,” which he attributed to the decomposition of an „overripe 
sensate culture.‟26  Indeed, religious pluralism is just as problematic in its 
own way as the old church establishments once were for the American 
colonists.  This is most strikingly reflected in the high level of litigation 
over church-state issues.  The guarantee of religious free exercise upsets 
the status quo, especially once it is accepted as a distinct value apart from 
                                                                                                                                                           
Putnam's Sons, 1888), 38-43. 
25
 Rosenstock-Huessy, Revolution, 493-95. 
26
 Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook (New 
York: E.   Dutton and Co., 1941),  241-52. 
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its original purpose of protecting dissenters – mainly Christian – from 
existing church establishments. 
  
Regarding matters of religious belief and practice, the state today affects an 
attitude of disinterested neutrality.  In a series of decisions, the Supreme 
Court has held that every government activity must be guided by a secular 
purpose and have a neutral „primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion.‟27  But these tests are not as straight-forward as they might 
appear to be for the simple reason that the effective spheres of political and 
religious activity cannot be neatly compartmentalized.  Both politics and 
religion are comprehensive in their reach.  Above all, they are inclusive; 
they are first of all inclusive even where they appear exclusive.  Both are 
unavoidably value-laden.  Neither is neutral in its effects, whether these are 
primary or subsidiary.  Indeed, all perception, thought, and action begins 
with biases, presuppositions, or predilections.
28
  Whether in theory or in 
practice, neither the state nor the church is apt to always agree which are 
the things of God and which are the things of Caesar (Matt. 22:21), 
assuming  they even attempt to draw a meaningful distinction between the 
secular and the sacred.  If Christian believers are to „Render . . . to all their 
dues‟ (Rom. 13:7), then some yardstick is required to determine what is 
due to each.  It is a problem of jurisdiction. 
  
This problem of jurisdiction has been compounded by the divided state of 
the church.  Public policy unavoidably differentiates among and differently 
affects the perceptions and practices of different churches and church 
                                                     
27
 Abington School District v Schempp (1963) 274 U.S. 222. 
28
 See Cornelius Van Til, In Defense of Biblical Christianity, vol.2: A Survey of 
Christian Epistemology (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing 
Company, 1977), 4-6. 
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communicants.  What may be regarded as welcome assistance by some 
may be regarded as an unwelcome intrusion by others.  Some religious 
traditions, like Puritanism, are militantly reformational.  Others, like the 
Social Gospel and liberation theology, concentrate on the transformation of 
social institutions.  Anabaptists, such as the Mennonites, generally tend 
toward strict separationism and political quietism.
29
  Others, among them 
Roman Catholics, seek close cooperation between church and state.
30
  
Religious liberty means something very different in each case. 
  
Particular laws and policies burden the members of some sects more than 
others.  When class legislation was still the exception rather than the rule, 
relief was usually sought in the form of exemptions or favourable court 
rulings.  But exemptions have come to be treated as privileges rather than 
immunities; and court rulings have become highly unpredictable and 
subjective in the absence of a clear interpretative tradition.
31
  General 
policy legislation invariably imposes hardships on those who, for legitimate 
religious reasons, cannot or will not comply.  These hardships may be 
further aggravated by overly stringent and sometimes quite logical 
renderings of the vagaries of legislative language into administrative 
practice.  A simple turn of phrase or an undefined term may inspire novel 
                                                     
29
 See John Howard Yoder, The Christian Witness to the State. Institute of Mennonite 
Studies, Number 3 (Newton, KS: Faith and Life Press, 1964); Willem Balke, Calvin 
and the Anabaptist Radicals, trans. William Heynen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1981),   59-65, 260-65. 
30
 See Robert E. Webber, The Secular Saint: A Case for Evangelical Social 
Responsibility (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1979), 75-165. 
31
 Walfred H. Peterson, Thy Liberty in Law (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1977),   
151, 156-59, notes the importance of personality factors in judicial interpretation.  See 
also Rousas John Rushdoony, „The War Against Christ's Kingdom,‟ A Special 
Chalcedon Alert, no. 1, January 1982. 
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bureaucratic initiatives.  The courts are then placed in the position of 
having to referee the competing claims of government officials, private 
citizens, and churches. 
  
The earlier cooperation that characterized the relationship of church and 
state was followed in this century by an era of relatively benign indulgence 
or accommodation.  But by the late 1970s prominent religious leaders were 
expressing their concern that the relationship was becoming increasingly 
confrontational.  Numerous books and articles appeared that criticized what 
the authors regarded as gratuitous regulatory interference in areas formerly 
left to church control.
32
  Significant numbers of church members had 
become persuaded that incidents involving licensure and certification 
requirements for church-operated schools and day care facilities, demands 
for church records by revenue agencies, restrictions on property use by 
zoning authorities, and bureaucratic stipulations concerning the proportion 
of time devoted to “religious” as opposed to “secular” activities were not 
simply unforeseen by-products of more general policy changes, or 
unfortunate misunderstandings, but deliberate provocations by officials in 
pursuit of hostile purposes.
33
 
  
Has the era of benign neglect of churches by the state come to an end?  
Considerable evidence suggests that the state is claiming such a wide scope 
of regulatory authority that its operations impinge upon routine church 
                                                     
32
 Two examples are Kent Kelly, The Separation of Church and Freedom (Southern 
Pines, NC: Calvary Press, 1980); and Clayton L. Nuttall, The Conflict: The Separation 
of Church and State (Schaumburg, IL: Regular Baptist Press, 1980). 
33
 See Franky Schaeffer, A Time for Anger: The Myth of Neutrality (Westchester, IL: 
Crossway Books, 1982). 
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activities.
34
  If this is true, it may be due in no small part to the high 
premium many churches place on an entangling partnership with the state 
in furthering either their own programs or those of the state.
35
  It does not 
necessarily or in all cases indicate a malicious intent.  If, in fact, the 
religious institutions of our society are being brought under the effective 
supervision and control of the state, their independence is perhaps being 
most threatened by the logical consequences of an avowedly beneficent 
purpose:  that is, the equalization of economic and social opportunities for 
all groups in our society. 
  
It serves little purpose, however, to speculate about the motives or 
intentions of legislators, bureaucrats, and judges.  Although intent – where 
it may be determined – does help confirm the direction of the changes, 
what matters in this context is the impact of the policy changes.  Despite all 
the talk about secular purposes and neutral effects, what is the object of a 
policy of religious pluralism – or syncretism – if not the formation of “a 
more perfect union” on the basis of some variety of universalism?  It is 
precisely here – in the realm of ideology – that the concern of churches 
with their doctrinal integrity and their customary immunity from state 
intervention in the form of regulation or taxation may come into conflict 
with the state's interest in ideological and administrative consistency.  
Exceptions admitted by either side tend to dilute the impact of its claims to 
authority in its proper sphere.
36
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 Some degree of relief has been provided by Congress through the subsequent passage 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.  See Appendix. 
35
 See Morgan, Politics, 37-38. 
36
 William A. Stanmeyer, Clear and Present Danger: Church and State in Post-
Christian America (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Books, 1983), 58, warns that if the 
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How then may the current state of affairs best be understood?  Have the 
most important conflicts between church and state already been resolved 
through a series of imperfect but generally agreeable compromises, or are 
the complexities of the issues only just now coming to the surface?   
  
The issue may be stated in terms of a conflict of jurisdiction between 
church and state.  As the state extends its operations into all areas of social 
life, it breaches the protective “wall of separation” that has traditionally 
kept the church free of obtrusive regulation by the civil authorities.  The 
widening scope of official state activity is manifested in several ways: first, 
a statutory extension of state police powers through social legislation over 
what are still widely regarded as ecclesiastical and domestic spheres of 
authority; second, a restriction or pre-emption of certain activities 
involving commerce, employment, and social relations -- whether 
conducted in public or in private -- that were once held to be outside the 
jurisdiction of the state; third, a vitiation of the principle of religious non-
interference through judicial interpretations that divorce the 
“establishment” and “free exercise” clauses of the First Amendment, and 
fourth, an adversary posture toward churches being taken by many agencies 
of the state while pursuing their regulatory objectives.
37
  As a consequence, 
                                                                                                                                                           
Christian does not assert a particular constitutional right „then he abdicates the 
protections that the laws have provided for him.  Worse, he abandons these 
protections for others.‟  On the other hand, weak cases often set bad precedents. 
37
 Stanmeyer notes, by way of illustrating the problem, the 1978 „proposed Revenue 
Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools,‟ which was delayed in its implementation 
as a result of intense lobbying: „This 'procedure' was actually a substantive rule; it 
proposed automatic loss of tax exemption for all private schools if found 
'discriminatory' by a court or agency, or if they lacked a 'minority' student enrollment 
of twenty percent of the 'minority school population' of the public school district in 
which the private school was located.  Further, the proposal set up a presumption that 
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churches are facing new restraints on their ecclesiastical or corporate rights, 
immunities, and privileges. 
 
Several presuppositions that underlie this thesis have influenced the manner 
of its investigation and elaboration. 
  
First, religion is a comprehensive human activity that embraces all of life, 
particularly the rules and values of society.  The Christian theologian, R. J. 
Rushdoony, maintains that „all law is enacted morality . . . and all morality 
presupposes a religion as its foundation.‟38  Paul Tillich's very broad 
definition of religion as an “ultimate concern,” which has been cited by the 
Supreme Court, includes theistic, pantheistic, and atheistic religion within 
its compass.
39
 
  
Second, the comprehensiveness of religion means that religious neutrality 
is a myth.  Francis J. Powers has written that „an attitude of indifference or 
neutrality toward religion, on the part of the state, is theologically and 
philosophically untenable.‟40 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
the private school is discriminatory if it fails to have, among other things, 'an 
increasing percentage of minority student enrollment' and 'employment of minority 
teachers.'  The only way the school could rebut this presumption would be to carry 'the 
burden of clearly and convincingly' demonstrating that it did not discriminate on racial 
grounds.  It would be only 'rare and unusual' to find a school not enrolling some 
minority students to be non-discriminatory.‟  Ibid., 113. 
38
 Rousas John Rushdoony, Law and Liberty (Fairfax, VA: Thoburn Press, 1977), 2. 
39
 United States v. Seeger (1965) 380 U.S. 187. 
40
 Francis J. Powers, Religious Liberty and the Police Power of the State: A Study of the 
Jurisprudential Concepts Underlying the Problem of Religious Freedom and Its 
Relationship to the Police Power in the United States With Special Reference to 
Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the Subject (Washington, 
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 46. 
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Third, the American constitutional system is essentially Christian in its 
foundational character and assumptions.  Justice William O. Douglas 
acknowledged this when he wrote that „a “religious” rite which violates 
standards of Christian ethics and morality is not in the true sense, in the 
constitutional sense, included within 'religion,' the 'free exercise' of which 
is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.‟41  From the bench, he reiterated an 
assumption in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) that has 
frequently been stated by the Court: „We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.‟ 
  
Fourth, the legal heritage of our country is Christian at its roots.  Sir 
Matthew Hale's maxim that Christianity is part of the common law was 
often cited by early members of the American judiciary, both in their 
written opinions and their scholarly commentaries.  For example, in his 
treatise on constitutional limitations, Chief Justice Thomas M. Cooley of 
Michigan wrote: 
 
The Christian religion was always recognized in the administration of the 
common law; and so far as that law continues to be the law of the land, the 
fundamental principles of that religion must continue to be recognized in the 
same cases and to the same extent as formerly.
42
 
 
What may be concluded from these observations, finally, is that perhaps 
too much attention has been paid to the alleged secularization of our 
political institutions and not enough to the religious and political 
                                                     
41
 William O. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and 
Company, 1954), 304. 
42
 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon 
the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, vol. 2, 8th ed. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1958),   91. 
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presuppositions that have favoured such an interpretation.  In recent years, 
it appears that the state has been assuming – whether intentionally or not – 
the essential attributes of a church.
43
  Far from pursuing a separationist 
course, the state has consistently attempted to convert churches and other 
institutions into instruments of its own social programs and has enlisted 
their cooperation or acquiescence by the granting and withholding of 
favours.
44
  This is by no means an exclusively American problem.  Writing 
in the 1930s, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy depicted it as part of a universal 
modern trend:  
 
The world owes it to the British Commonwealth that during the last 
centuries, donations, endowments, voluntary gifts, have been the mainspring 
of progress in many fields.  Were it not for the right of man to do what he 
liked with his property little would exist in religion, art, science, social and 
medical work today.  No king's arbitrary power was allowed to interfere 
with a man's last will as expressed in his testament.  On the independence of 
10,000 fortunes a civilization was based that allowed for a rich variety of 
special activities introduced by imaginative donors and founders.  The ways 
of life explored under the protection of an independent judiciary form a 
social galaxy.  Our modern dictators, however, are cutting deeply into this 
tradition.  This is achieved through progressive taxation of inheritance or 
limitation of a man's right over his property, by subsidizing institutions, like 
Oxford, which were independent formerly. . . .  The famous Dartmouth case 
                                                     
43
 This is nothing new.  The state was usually the central religious authority in ancient 
times.  Other institutions serve much the same purpose, as suggested by Hazel Barnes, 
The University as the New Church (London: C. A. Watts & Co., 1970).  The 
separation of religious and civil is unique to the biblical tradition, but it has been a 
source of contention ever since church and state first joined in partnership during the 
latter years of the Roman Empire.  For the early modern period, see Otto Gierke, 
Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1900; Boston: Beacon Press, 1958),   91.   
44
 See, for example, Lyle E. Schaller, The Churches' War on Poverty (Nashville, TN: 
Abington Press, 1967),   77-79. 
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which Daniel Webster won against the State (a striking example of the 
progressive significance of the Whiggish principle) was tried only a century 
ago; yet the conditions which made it possible for Webster to win are 
rapidly vanishing, at least in Europe.
45
 
 
Exemptions that were designed to protect religious liberties are now 
perceived in some political circles either as customary privileges which are 
not binding on the state or else as bargaining chips with which to advance 
its policies.  The wall of separation, as it now stands, appears to be a 
permeable one that simultaneously consigns churches – often with their 
cheerful cooperation – to a position of irrelevance within the contemporary 
American culture and enables the state to absorb their traditional functions 
and prerogatives.  Indeed, a retrospective look at the record suggests that 
the courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies of the land have become 
involved in an experiment to gradually disengage our political system from 
its dominant religious and legal heritage.
46
  Secular equivalents to religious 
institutions now promote human relations, education, health, and welfare in 
a manner reminiscent of William James's proposal for „a moral equivalent 
of war.‟47 
  
Although education has been at the centre of much of the conflict in recent 
years, school issues are only the most visible part of a more fundamental 
clash of religious values. Richard E. Morgan regards the 
“governmentalization of welfare services” and the “educational revolution” 
as the two major trigger issues that have led to a growing conflict between 
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 William James, Pragmatism and Other Essays (New York: Washington Square Press, 
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church and state due to the rise of a reaction in the 1960's against “the 
traditional ideology of privatism.”  Morgan adds: 
 
These radical secularists tend to regard private charitable activity as illusory 
and psychologically corrupting, and the notion of religious institutions 
administering public funds is anathema.  Religious schools are seen as 
especially regressive. . . .  There is, it should be noted, a direct conflict 
between the radical secularist demand for governmentalization of social 
welfare and education, and the principle of "subsidiarity" which looms large 
in Catholic social thought.  As formulated by Pius XI, this holds that it is 
"unjust" and "gravely harmful to turn over to a greater society . . . functions 
and services which can be performed by lesser bodies. . . ."  Thus families 
and private associations should handle all possible functions, and nothing 
which they are capable of doing should be displaced "upward" to 
government.
48
 
 
At stake is who or what will define the political and social agenda of the 
future?  It is a question of whose vision of the future, whose values, whose 
religion will prevail.  Since church and state are so influential in shaping 
public opinion, both have long been utilized as ideological proving grounds 
by various social movements seeking to mould society according to the 
desire of their hearts.  Possibly as a consequence, church and state now 
claim overlapping spheres of authority.  If they continue to find themselves 
                                                     
48
 Morgan, Politics, 131-32.  It would be a mistake, however, to regard this radical 
secularism as something fundamentally outside and antithetical to the Judeo-Christian 
religious tradition.  Comparable views are expressed by many professing Christians.  
See W. Stanley Mooneyham, What Do You Say to a Hungry World? (Waco, TX: 
Word Books, 1975),   25-32; Ronald J. Sider, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger: A 
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at cross-purposes, each may be expected to assert an independent claim – 
perhaps even a monopoly of competence – over areas of that are of mutual 
concern.  
  
More than any other social institution today, excepting the family, the 
church derives its original identity and authority from a source that is 
independent of the state.
49
  The church steadfastly maintains that it answers 
to a higher authority regarding its sacraments, ceremonies, disciplines, and 
doctrines.  Otherwise it risks becoming a creature or appendage of the state.  
The state is equally steadfast in upholding its immediate responsibility 
regarding the protection of public health, safety, welfare, morals, and 
peace.  But the sphere of its interests has grown so large that the state is 
again coming into direct competition with the church and has begun 
asserting regulatory control over many church activities as a sovereign 
right.  The concept of the church as a “charitable public trust,” which is a 
holdover from the days of established churches, has opened the door to 
inroads by the state into church affairs as, for instance, in California, where 
the Worldwide Church of God was temporarily placed into receivership by 
the Attorney General and more than sixty churches were recently 
threatened with sale for back taxes over a dispute concerning filing 
requirements.
50
 
  
Several consequences appear to follow from the expansion of jurisdiction 
and the tightening of regulations by the state: first, a decline of civil and 
                                                     
49
 Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1931),   99-109. 
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 See Ted Witt, „Church Tax Veto Hits Home,‟ The Times-Advocate (Escondido, Cal.), 
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religious liberty in those areas of public life where explicitly religious 
expression is either excluded, as in the public school classroom and 
auditorium, or where it is otherwise made unwelcome, as in the use of 
some public facilities for religious gatherings and displays;
51
 second, a 
withering away of independent public institutions – sometimes called 
„mediating structures‟52 – in favour of agencies dominated, subsidized, or 
otherwise regulated by the state; and third, an attitude among some public 
officials that may be described as missionary, messianic, or authoritarian.
53
 
  
The relationship between church and state tends to fall into one of several 
categories: first, a union of church and state in which dissenters are 
persecuted; second, a union of church and state in which dissenters are 
tolerated; third, a separation of church and state in which believers are 
persecuted; and fourth, a separation of church and state in which religious 
liberty prevails.
54
  But these categories are not necessarily exclusive.  In 
ancient Rome, licensed religions were tolerated and unlicensed ones were 
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 See Peter J. Ferrara, Religion and the Constitution: A Reinterpretation (Washington, 
DC: Free Congress Research & Education Foundation, 1983), 1-13. 
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 See Theodore M. Kerrine and Richard John Neuhaus, „Mediating Structures: A 
Paradigm for Democratic Pluralism,‟ The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 446 (November 1979): 10-18, hereafter cited as Annals; 
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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and wishes to see the principle extended 
further.  Berman, „Interaction,‟ Mercer Law Review, 420-21. 
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York: David McKay Company, 1974), 303-15. 
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 See Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America: A History (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1902; Burt Franklin, 1970), 7-18 passim. 
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persecuted.  Historical circumstances have also depended on whether the 
state dominates the church or the church dominates the state.  The prevalent 
pattern since the rise of nation-states has been a union of church and state 
in which the state dominates the church. 
  
Historical experience – if not logic – shows religion and politics to be 
inseparable.  Each is an arena for the interplay of basic beliefs about human 
nature, power, and society. Each is an expression of faith guided by 
presuppositions that are never finally definitive or indisputable.
55
   
 
V    THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The dichotomy of church and state confronts us, initially and finally, as a 
political problem.  It is a problem that began at a specific place at a specific 
time in a specific political context: the imperial reign of the Roman 
Caesars.  As one writer notes: „In ancient times, as in primitive society 
today, there existed no problem of Church and State, for the very good 
reason that no church, in the modern sense of the word, existed.‟56  While 
the issue between them has not troubled all climes and all seasons equally, 
it looms large in the history of the West.  Religion at one time served 
mainly as an accessory of statecraft.  The advent of Judaism and 
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 Addressing himself to the writing of history, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy remarked: 
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Huessy, Revolution,  693, 694. 
56
 T. M. Parker, Christianity and the State in the Light of History, Bampton Lectures 
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1955), 1. 
88                 The Western Australian Jurist 
 
 
Christianity set new forces into motion that freed religious energies from a 
preoccupation with parochial loyalties.  How the church – specifically  the 
Christian Church – emerged independent of the state and how the two have 
interacted since that time are foremost among the institutional forces that 
have moded western civilization. 
 
The problem may be explored in any of several dimensions.  The political 
dimension may be brought into focus with a question: How can two distinct 
institutions, similar or overlapping in composition, make authoritative yet 
independent claims to the obedience and loyalty of their members?  The 
durability of the coexistence of church and state may be regarded as a 
major catalyst in the development of western political traditions.  Their 
rivalry in matters of jurisdiction often prompted accommodations which 
have served as prototypes for subsequent political innovations.  American 
federalism, for example, owes many of its essential features to Puritan 
political experiments in colonial New England.  Various constitutional 
liberties and concepts of limited government derived much of their original 
impetus from struggles for religious freedom. 
 
This suggests another question: What circumstances permitted such a 
conflict of authority to be resolved by limiting the jurisdiction of the state?  
The ingredients for an understanding are stored in the laboratory of history.  
Issues raised during earlier religious controversies provide a basis for 
analysing current disputes.  Early Christians and Jews challenged the state 
cult of imperial Rome by refusing obeisance to Caesar as their lord or 
master.  Both groups sought immunity from the religious laws and had to 
endure periods of official persecution while defending their distinct identity 
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and way of life. 
 
A third dimension, the ideological, is arguably the most important to a 
recognition of what is at stake on both sides. It involves a different 
question: How is it possible to establish and maintain a political consensus 
without bringing all authority under one sovereign head?  Differing 
perceptions of sovereignty, law, and citizenship may, after all, indicate 
seriously divided loyalties. Where social institutions fall out of step with 
each other and unifying traditions are weakened, even ordinary stresses 
may threaten political disruption and demoralization. The ability of a 
society to face change and conflict with unity and equanimity is a measure 
of its moral health.  Common values and a common political agenda are 
generally preferred as a society's first line of defence.  Normally this means 
an assimilation of all groups and traditions to some existing or purposely 
devised set of norms. This function is usually filled by a civil religion. 
 
It is sometimes objected that the relationship between church and state is 
not characteristically political and, compared with earlier eras, is no longer 
a matter of particular concern in a modern secular society.  The 
contemporary American church – if it may be described in the singular – 
does not press a distinctly political claim.  Its ordinances are not 
comparable in nature or force to those of the state.  Moreover, people 
expect that questions of faith today be left to the private dictates of 
individual consciences. The church that addresses political issues or 
otherwise imposes its separate will overreaches these customary limits at 
its own peril. 
 
90                 The Western Australian Jurist 
 
 
While this point may be conceded in part, it fails to consider the dynamic 
nature of religion, particularly Christianity. Changes in political 
circumstances or religious priorities may redefine, even shatter, any 
existing accommodation between church and state. American political 
institutions have long operated on the basis of shared moral values and 
assumptions that derive in large part from the Bible and Christianity.
57
  It is 
worth considering whether and how well such institutions can work under a 
deliberately secular, pluralistic regime.  In the absence of a common moral 
ground that can help channel conflict, secular or religious militancy may 
stir up fear and reaction.  The volume of current legislation and litigation 
concerning religious issues is a sign of growing dissension over the proper 
role of the state in religion and the church in public life. 
 
As to whether this is a political question, then, the objection may be met 
very simply: any association between church and state is unavoidably 
political.  On the one hand, the state values religion – at least in the generic 
sense – as a means of upholding an ideological consensus and encouraging 
civil peace.  On the other hand, the Christian Church is historically called 
to acknowledge „one Lord, one faith, one baptism‟ (Eph. 4:5): which is to 
say, one citizenship in which all final authority is vested in a sovereign 
God.  Such a claim is treasonable if the state – if Caesar – is rightfully 
sovereign.  Here, as always, the issue is joined.  It is a suitable point of 
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departure for a historical study of the problem. 
 
APPENDIX:  SUBSEQUENT CONTROVERSIES 
 
This article is drawn from the first chapter, “The Imprint of Culture,” of the 
author‟s doctoral dissertation.58 
 
Many of the issues discussed above subsequently came to a head in 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The Supreme Court 
held that the Free Exercise Clause permitted the State of Oregon to prohibit 
the sacramental use of peyote through a neutral law of general applicability 
and, thus, also to deny unemployment benefits to employees who were 
discharged on these grounds.   
 
This ruling met with strong opposition.  Congress responded by passing the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which, among other things, 
used section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect religious rights 
against action taken by the states.  The Supreme Court struck down this 
provision of the law in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  The 
Court upheld the City‟s use of a historical preservation ordinance that 
prevented a church from expanding its facility. 
 
Congress subsequently passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 in response.  The new law bypassed the Court‟s 
Fourteenth Amendment objection to the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act by using the Constitution‟s Spending Clause to require recipients of 
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federal funding to accommodate the earlier law‟s provisions regarding 
religious freedom.  Given that all localities rely on federal subsidies, the 
resulting irony is almost whimsical.  What more appropriate illustration 
could there be of the much larger problem Congress itself has created: that 
is, a regime of fiscal, educational, and social regulation which has spawned 
so much First Amendment litigation in recent decades? 
